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The international investment regime and local populations: are the weakest voices unheard? 
Nicolás M. Perrone
*
 
Abstract 
The laws that govern the allocation and use of resources can not only annihilate individual property 
rights but also destroy community. Locals’ participation in decisions about property is therefore vital. 
This article argues that local populations currently have a limited voice in foreign investment 
decisions, and that the international investment regime contributes to this unfair result. The 
interpretation of investment tribunals, according to international investment treaties, relies on 
reasoning that promotes the calculability of investments and the trust of foreign investors above all. 
Often, this interpretation threatens other property rights and community values. This article illustrates 
these dangers using the cases of Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia and Chevron v. Ecuador. It concludes by 
suggesting that international law can be part of a solution to these problems; but for that, we need to 
give local populations a meaningful role in foreign investment governance. 
 
Keywords: International investment law; Investment arbitration; Human rights; Local participation; 
Foreign investment   
 
Introduction 
Foreign investment decisions have important implications for host states and local populations. The 
right decisions may promote economic development; the wrong decisions may have devastating social 
and environmental consequences. Currently, international investment law literature looks at foreign 
investment from the perspective of the state, emphasising its right to regulate and its ability to curb 
negative consequences of foreign investment.
1
  
                                                     
*
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1
 This perspective is dominant in the global administrative law literature. See Stephan Schill, ‘W(h)ither 
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law’ (2011) 22(3) The European 
Journal of International Law 875, 899–901; M. Sornarajah, Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment, 
Starting Anew in International Investment Law (2012) Columbia FDI Perspectives 74, online: 
<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_74.pdf>.  
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 From a holistic perspective, it can be said that this kind of inquiry shows two limitations. First, 
it mainly focuses on the situation after the establishment of the foreign investment, paying less 
attention to how foreign investors may have begun the project against the will and aspirations of host 
states and, particularly, of local populations. Second, it removes local populations from any 
meaningful role in the analysis both before and after the establishment of the foreign investment.   
 The objective of this article is to focus precisely on these two blind spots in the literature: the 
period before the establishment of the investments, and the role of local populations in foreign 
investment relations. A holistic view has never been at the forefront of the foreign investment debate. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, part of the discussion focused on the regulation of multinational 
corporations and the need to pay more attention to divergent national interests.
2
 But in the last thirty 
years, these issues have lost importance because of neoliberal development policies and the 
complexities of international investment law.  
 There are good reasons to be suspicious of the resulting narrow view, as it affects the 
bargaining power of foreign investors, host states and local populations differently. In his seminal 
contribution on bargaining in the shadow of the law, Robert Hale did not have a particular interest in 
foreign investment, but he ended referring to ‘the interests of vast numbers of persons’ in natural 
resources.
3
 He highlighted that:      
 
[I]t makes a great difference to many who live elsewhere how the concessions are 
apportioned, whether the resources are exploited at all or are locked up, how they shall be 
rationed (in case the supply, at the price charged, falls short of the demand), and what 
government shall control the disposition of any revenues derived from their taxation.
4
 
 
In his analysis, Hale underlined some fundamental problems we still see today in the field of foreign 
investment. He noted that foreign investors invest large amounts of money in places where they have 
no representation in the local government. Already in the 1920s, for this reason, these corporations 
were relying on their home states to put pressure on local governments. This attitude, for Hale, 
contained ‘the most fertile seeds of modern warfare’.5 At the same time, Hale also highlighted a 
                                                     
2
 See United Nations, Report of the Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Role of Multinational Corporations 
on Development and International Relations (1974). 
3
 In this article, Hale is interested in the bargaining between employers and labour. Robert Hale, ‘Coercion and 
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ (1923) 38:3 Political Science Quarterly 470, 493. 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Ibid, 494. 
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holistic view of the foreign investment problem. For him, foreign investment evoked questions about 
‘democracy, representative government, international economic conflicts and their adjustments’.6 
 Today, Hale’s observations spark two different reflections. On the one hand, the international 
community managed to avoid foreign investment wars. The international investment regime (IIR) 
probably deserves some recognition for this as it encourages the peaceful resolution of foreign 
investment disputes through international arbitration.
7
 Today, this regime consists of more than 3,000 
treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign investment.
8
 The main objective of the IIR is to 
protect foreign investment from the abuse and arbitrariness of host states. The preambles and clauses 
of these treaties focus essentially on the treatment host states grant to foreign investors after 
establishment. Any foreign investor protected by a treaty has the right to launch international 
arbitration against the host state claiming unfair discrimination, expropriation without compensation, 
or the violation of the fair and equitable standard of treatment (FET).
9
  
 On the other hand, most investment treaties and investment law literature have avoided talking 
about local participation, representative government and foreign investor rights.
10
 The protection of 
foreign investor rights very often pays little attention to the questions that matter most for local 
populations, such as whether a target resource should be exploited or how the benefits should be 
distributed. Investment tribunals instead assume the task of protecting foreign investor rights, 
overlooking the events leading to the investment and the resulting scope of these rights. According to 
most investment awards and a large part of the literature, the crucial task of the IIR is reviewing state 
behaviour after the establishment of the investment, and drawing the correct line between foreign 
investor rights and the state’s regulatory authority.11  
                                                     
6
 Ibid. 
7
 According to Broches, one of the main promoters of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID), this regime would help to ‘remove investment disputes 
from the intergovernmental political sphere’. See Aaron Broches, ‘Settlement of Investment Disputes’ in Aaron 
Broches (ed), Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 161–178, 163. 
8
 According to the most recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data, the 
number of investment treaties has reached 3268 as of early 2015. See UNCTAD, Recent Trends in IIAs and 
ISDS (February 2015), UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/1, online: 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf>.  
9
 Jeswald Salacuse, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law 
Journal 429. 
10
 A relevant exception is the work of Schneiderman, who focuses on the constitutional model promoted by the 
IIR. See David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization. Investment Rules and Democracy’s 
Promise (Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
11
 The tribunal in Saluka, for instance, noted that ‘international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and 
definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered ‘permissible’ and ‘commonly accepted as falling 
within the police or regulatory power of States and, thus, noncompensable’. See Saluka v. the Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Partial Award (17 March 2006) [263]. 
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 The power of investment tribunals to review host state measures is necessary, according to 
some of this literature, because foreign investors have no representation in local governments.
12
 As 
this article will illustrate, however, foreign investment relations show that foreign investors often have 
easy access to host governments before and after the establishment of a project.
13
 Things could go 
wrong, obviously, and access does not mean that foreign investors always get what they want. But the 
reality seems to be that host states have a high incentive to treat foreign investors as well as possible. 
Many governments around the world depend on foreign investment to achieve economic growth 
under a neoliberal paradigm. The reputation built by their initial investment treaties then becomes a 
fundamental asset for attracting further foreign investment.  
 If attracting foreign investment is a main goal of contemporary states, it is worth asking 
whether foreign investors’ concerns about mistreatment are overstated or, perhaps, whether the IIR 
protects foreign investors from actors besides host states. The main threat to foreign investments, in 
fact, may lie in the competing interests of local populations. The foreign investor rights that facilitate 
the current economic transformation—ie the emergence of a transnational capitalist class14—may 
share something very important with the property rights that made possible the domestic capitalist 
revolutions of the 19th century. They essentially protect corporate interests from the population (not 
from governments).
15
 Host governments sometimes react against foreign investment after 
establishment. But, in most cases, these reactions are due to previous mobilisations of local 
populations. Host governments rely on foreign investment for growth, but need to maintain internal 
order and win elections.      
 The caseload of foreign investment disputes confirms these dynamics. In this article, I will 
illustrate my argument using two disputes: Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia and Chevron v. Ecuador.
16
 The 
                                                     
12
 See Thomas Wälde, ‘Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration under the Shadow of the Dual Role of 
the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals' Duty to Ensure, Pro-Actively, the quality of Arms’ (2010) 26:1 
Arbitration International 3; Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/06/18, Award (28 March 2011) [57]. 
13
 Robert Reich, ‘Who Is Them?’ (1991) 69:2 Harvard Business Review 77; Raymond Saner, Lichia Yiu and 
Mikael Søndergaard, ‘Business Diplomacy Management: A Core Competency for Global Companies’ (2000) 
14:1 Academy of Management Executive 80. 
14
 Bhupinder Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ (2004) 15:1 
European Journal of International Law 1. 
15
 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time ([1957] 2001) 
233. Adam Smith argued a similar point. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations ([1776] 1904) V.1.55. 
16
 Aguas del Tunari v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/02/3; Chevron v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No. 2009–23. These two disputes illustrate a common dynamic in investment arbitrations related to human 
rights and the environment. Another example is Bilcon v. Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009–04, 
Award (15 March 2015). In Bilcon, the Canadian government decided not to authorise a mining project because 
of popular outcry and the results of an environmental impact assessment. Consider also the domestic litigation 
against Coca-Cola in the Kerala State, India, where the unsustainable use of underground water by Coca-Cola 
resulted in popular mobilisation and litigation in Kerala. See Perumatty Grama Panchayat v. State of Kerala, 16 
December, 2003. 
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case of Aguas del Tunari involved the privatisation of the public water system in the city of 
Cochabamba, Bolivia. In an opaque process with only one bidder, Bolivia awarded this concession to 
the multinational Bechtel without consultation with the local population. A few weeks later, this 
foreign investor increased the tariffs substantially and restricted alternative access to water supplies. 
The population of Cochabamba replied with a large public protest, asking for the termination of the 
concession. This first led to a brutal repression by the Bolivian authorities, and later to Bolivia’s 
unilateral termination of the concession as a result of the unprecedented social mobilisation. Bechtel 
responded with an arbitration before an investment tribunal, which it later dropped due to 
international pressure.
17
 
 The case of Chevron is one of the latest episodes in the global litigation that resulted from the 
environmental disaster in Lago Agrio, Ecuador. Texaco’s operations in the area began in 1967 and 
ended in 1992. By the end of the concession, all the parties involved had to acknowledge the large 
environmental disaster in the Lago Agrio. With no active participation by the local population, 
however, Texaco agreed with Ecuador to carry out a limited remediation. The program concluded in 
1998, and Ecuador absolved Texaco from any further responsibility. Texaco was later acquired by 
Chevron. The local population was never satisfied with the agreed remediation and began litigation 
first in the United States and later in Ecuador, where they were finally awarded 8.5 billion dollars in 
damages.
18
 The government of Ecuador embraced the cause of the local population only after this 
decision, and has since defended the legitimacy of the case against Chevron. The foreign investor has 
struck back by claiming before an investment tribunal that the remediation agreement precluded any 
further litigation, and that the decision on damages is the outcome of corruption. This arbitration is 
still pending.    
 The events leading to these disputes indicate that the IIR is more than a regime protecting 
foreign investment from host states. It also constitutes a site where foreign investors and local 
populations struggle over local resources. From this holistic perspective, the IIR is about more than 
foreign investor rights and state regulatory power. What is at stake also includes the right to 
participation, local property rights, and community values.
19
 These relational implications suggest that 
property law and property theory can be an appropriate framework with which to analyse the IIR. 
Recently, Sprankling has argued that the IIR constitutes part of an emerging international law of 
                                                     
17
 Sarah Anderson and Sara Grusky, Food and Water Watch and the Institute for Policy Studies, Challenging 
Corporate Investor Rule (2007), online: <www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/challenging-Corporate-
Investor-Rule-final.pdf> 18. 
18
 Judith Kimerling, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, Chevron 
Texaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco’ (2006) 38 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 413. 
19
 This disregard for local populations, as Rajagopal argues, is a systemic problem of international law. 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World 
Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
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property.
20
 More importantly, progressive property scholars in the United States have been focusing 
on the relational importance of property, ie the sociology of property, highlighting the relevance of 
democracy and participation for a legitimate property system.
21
   
 Relying on this property literature, this article argues that local populations have limited or no 
participation in foreign investment decisions that affect their rights and values, and that the IIR 
contributes to this unfair result. Foreign investors establish themselves in host countries with clear 
expectations regarding the use of resources, and these expectations often clash with the aspirations of 
local populations. When local populations do not have the opportunity to participate in foreign 
investment decisions, foreign investors may end up establishing projects that ignore local aspirations. 
Later, this may bring about local political mobilisation, but host states probably have few options with 
which to respond to these political demands that do not require paying compensation to foreign 
investors. In this way, the outcome is often a situation where local populations have to adjust to the 
expectations of foreign investors. 
 This article is organised as follows. The first section examines the close connection between 
property and the fundamental values of a population. Participation can be said to be one of these 
values, in particular the right to participate in decisions that can affect local property rights and 
aspirations. This section ends by suggesting the negative implications of international investment 
rules on local participation. The second section focuses on the IIR as a regime for the control of local 
resources. It describes the operation of this regime and how it can lead to negative consequences 
unknown to local  populations. The third section explores how investment arbitrators favour the 
position of foreign investors. It describes the doctrine of legitimate expectations, highlighting that this 
reliance-based reasoning hinders local participation in foreign investment decisions and contributes to 
unfair results for local populations (like the ones in Cochabamba and Lago Agrio). The fourth section 
contrasts foreign investor rights with a democratic view of property. It explains that investment 
arbitrators emphasise foreign investor substantive expectations, so it is the locality that needs to adapt 
to the rationality of the business project and not otherwise. To remedy this unfair result, this section 
analyses the basis for a meaningful participation of local populations. 
 This article concludes by calling into question the foundations of the IIR. While supporters 
have justified the need for this regime using foreign investors’ inability to vote or participate in the 
political life of host countries, a look at foreign investment relations indicates that the ones excluded 
from participation in fundamental investment decisions are rather local populations. As it currently 
stands, the IIR probably facilitates foreign investment decisions, but at the high cost of limiting local 
participation and aspirations. This article ends by suggesting that international law can still be part of 
                                                     
20
 John Sprankling, The International Law of Property (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
21
 See Section 1 infra. 
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the solution, and that thinking differently about the international governance of foreign investment 
could be an important step towards a more legitimate use of local resources. 
 
1. Property, community values and participation 
A thriving and relatively new strand of property scholarship has shifted the focus of this field 
dramatically, moving from ‘legal relations between individuals with respect to things’ to a social and 
holistic view of property relations. For progressive property scholars, property represents a foundation 
for social relations.
22
 It incorporates values about justice, ethics and fairness as well as principles of 
economic organisation and knowledge.
23
 In this account, it can be said that property shares a relation 
of ‘circular causation’ with fundamental social values.24 It incorporates these values into the operation 
of legal techniques for the control of resources, but it also shapes those values according to the 
socially accepted purposes of resources (and the means to achieve these purposes).
25
 In a recent work, 
for instance, Singer describes the intimate connection between property and democratic values, 
showing how equality and participation are fundamental principles for some property institutions.
26
  
Property, in this way, is not only a reflection of values, it is also a means to maintain and 
reproduce social values and practices.
27
 Seen from this perspective, the traditional legal notion of 
property as an in rem right covers only a fraction of this institution. It overlooks the social importance 
of property. In political philosophy, there are many and divergent references to property in this sense. 
Locke and Marx, for instance, were not referring to individual legal relations when talking about 
property.
28
 They were interested instead in the social values that property creates and maintains: the 
values that motivate and justify individual, state and communal behaviour. This relationship between 
property and values is of fundamental importance for progressive property scholars. In their view, 
property can create, maintain or destroy community.
29
  
  
                                                     
22
 Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer and Laura Underkuffler, ‘A Statement of Progressive 
Property’ (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 743. 
23
 Amnon Lehavi, ‘The Global Law of the Land’ (2010) 81 University Of Colorado Law Review 425, 469.  
24
 See Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!’ (1991) 15 Legal Studies Forum 327, 334–
5. 
25
 See Annelise Riles, ‘Property as Legal Knowledge: Means and Ends’ (2004) 10 The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 775. 
26
 Joseph Singer, ‘Property as the Law of Democracy’ (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287, 1304.  
27
 Carol Rose, ‘Property as the Keystone Right?’ (1996) 71 Notre Dame Law Review 329, 329, 362–5. 
28
 C. B. Macpherson (ed), Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions (University of Toronto Press, Scholarly 
Publishing Division, 2nd edn 1978). 
29
 Amnon Lehavi, ‘How Property Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community’ (2009) 10:1 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 43. See also Gregory Alexander, ‘Intergenerational Communities’ (2014) 8:1 Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights 21. 
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Unsurprisingly, a historical approach to property shows that the values that property articulates 
are plural and changing.
30
 Property rights and duties can privilege values such as propriety, autonomy, 
wealth maximisation or democracy. Notions of property that emphasise propriety represent sources of 
rights as well as obligations for property holders. This, as Rose explains, is illustrated by the phrase 
noblesse oblige.
31
 The importance of this view weakened substantially as a result of liberal thinking, 
which finds in property a castle built to defend individual freedom. This notion of property as one’s 
castle remains somewhat influential, but its importance has decreased because of the rise of wealth 
maximisation as the fundamental purpose for property.
32
 Starting with the Scottish Enlightenment, the 
justification of property institutions has been dominated by economic ideas, which aim to motivate 
individuals to act according to their own self-interest.
33
   
 Property institutions articulate values that can coexist, clash or both. The maximisation of 
wealth very often clashes with a democratic view of property: the most paradigmatic example of this 
is the present material inequality that affects the entire world. The problem of distribution is presently 
very serious. At the same time, the caveat that we need something first in order to distribute remains 
valid. It is not easy to envision a growing democratic society without economic growth.
34
 
 Other property values, in addition, are not universal aspirations—like wealth maximisation or 
democracy—but rather represent the particular preferences of each local population. Property scholars 
recognise the local character of property institutions, accepting that the value conflict in property can 
adopt a universal versus local structure.
35
. This kind of conflict has become more and more common 
with the expansion of multinational corporations and a transnational capitalist class.
36
 Foreign 
investors establish in host countries with expectations about property that not always have a strong 
connection with local values. For many local populations, decisions about the allocation and 
distribution of entitlements should factor in more than the ‘maximum effective use of its economic 
resources’.37  
                                                     
30
 Macpherson (n 28) 1–14.  
31
 Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion (Westview Press, 1994) 62–4. 
32
 Ibid, 1–8; Joseph Singer, ‘The Ownership Society and the Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just 
Obligations’ (2006) 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 309, 314–6. 
33
 For a detailed analysis of this influence in the United States, see Gregory Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (1997) 60–6. 
34
 Rose, (n 31) 3–4. 
35
 Lehavi (n 23) 457–9, 468–9; Hanoch Dagan, Property, Values and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 
2011) 44. 
36
 See Chimni (n 14). 
37
 Contrast El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case no ARB/03/15, Award (31 October 2011) [369] with Rajagopal (n 
19) 139, 169, 293. 
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 Looking at property from a democratic perspective highlights this plurality of voices and 
underscores the need to resolve conflicts according to the principles of equality and participation.
38
 
Democracy is a universal aspiration that nonetheless can serve to protect community values—at least 
to a certain extent. It can be said that democratic property requires, among other things, property 
entitlements that respect individual human rights, such as the basic right to water. More essential for 
community values, however, is the idea that democratic property demands a respect for equality and 
participation.
39
 This can relate to a more egalitarian distribution of resources as well as a more equal 
participation of different people and values in the process of property creation and distribution. While 
there is no human right to an egalitarian distribution, many human rights instruments explicitly 
incorporate the right to participate in government and in decisions related to the use of resources. For 
instance, consider the American Convention of Human Rights (Article 23), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Article 25), and Convention 169 of the International Labour 
Organisation.
40
 
 The importance of participation in property relations is highlighted at domestic and 
international levels. Fischel asserts that the victims of unfair property interventions in the United 
States are very often those who had no opportunity to participate in the political process that 
ultimately led to arbitrary or abusive decisions.
41
 This argument—as mentioned above—has been 
used to justify the international protection of foreign investors. Investment law scholarship readily 
accepts that an inability to participate in the political process leaves a group’s interests undefended, 
but ironically hesitates to apply this logic to participation by local populations. Formal participation, 
in this regard, should not be the only criterion used to identify vulnerable groups. Large multinational 
corporations amply compensate for their lack of political rights with substantial economic power and 
other forms of participation.
42
 Limiting the idea of participation to formal political participation, in 
other words, can only be misleading.
43
      
 Either through political, administrative or other means of participation, a robust idea of 
property requires everybody whose rights or community values may be impaired to have an equal 
voice in decisions about resources.
44
 Historically, a fundamental principle of democracy has been that 
                                                     
38
 Singer (n 26); Anna di Robilant, ‘Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus Principle and 
Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law’ (2014) 62:2 American Journal of Comparative Law 367.  
39
 Singer (n 26); Di Robilant (n 38) 305.  
40
 For an analysis of free, prior and informed consent, see Section 4. 
41
 William Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Harvard University Press, 1995) 107. 
42
 See Reich (n 13). 
43
 Property scholars have also made this argument. See William Treanor, ‘The Original Understanding of the 
Takings Clause and the Political Process,’ (1995) 95 Columbia Law Review 782, 863-4; Daniel Farber, 
‘Economic analysis and just compensation,’ (1992) 12:2 International Review of Law and Economics 125, 130. 
44
 Singer (n 26) 1326. This is consistent with a procedural view of the rule of law and a deliberative 
understanding of democracy. See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (Cambridge 
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decisions about property need to be taken by parliament or congress, where allegedly all people are 
represented. Equality of representation emerged, in this sense, to the detriment of individual 
freedom.
45
 A contemporary view of democracy, however, suggests that this safeguard for community 
values—if it ever worked—may not be working anymore. Rosanvallon shows in his work that 
representative democracy suffers from a series of limitations; in particular, he notes that the loyalty 
between people and their representatives is partially broken. A traditional approach to political 
participation is therefore not useful anymore. Instead, Rosanvallon claims that democracy should lie 
today in new formal and informal channels that would allow equal participation in crucial decisions 
for individuals and the population.
46
 
 But the international sphere, at least so far, has not been a catalyst for the emergence of new 
participatory channels. Perhaps, in fact, it has been quite the opposite (as Rajagopal suggests
47
). 
During the decolonisation period, newly independent countries relied on self-determination and 
sovereignty to decide on their own social institutions.
48
 This transition required countries, as seen 
above, to set their own property systems. But the limitations imposed on self-determination at the 
international level were severe. International investment rules were relevant in hindering host state 
sovereignty as a means to protect Western interests.
49
 Foreign investor rights prevailed over national 
aspirations, justified by the need to promote property rights protection and domestic economic 
development.
50
  
 Today, things are not very different. The persistent focus on foreign investment protection 
silences the voices and interests of local populations in the allocation and use of key local resources. 
This can lead to great evils, especially in the case of natural resources, that are not always tolerable. 
The water privatisation in Cochabamba did not take into account local voices and aspirations. It did 
not consider the likely opposition to an increase of the water tariffs and the prohibition of traditional 
ways of collecting water from rivers and rainfall. Takings these expectations seriously, however, 
could have avoided a social dispute that can be described with no exaggeration as a short-lived civil 
war.
51
 In the case of the dispute between Ecuador and Chevron/Texaco, the struggle over local 
                                                                                                                                                                     
University Press, 2012) 107; Jürgen Habermas, Ciaran Cronin (ed) and Pablo De Greiff (ed), The Inclusion of 
the Other: Studies in Political Theory (The MIT Press, 1998) 129–55. 
45
 The tension between equality and freedom is a constant in liberal democracies. See Pierre Rosanvallon, La 
contre-démocratie: la politique à l'âge de la défiance (Groupe Seuil, 2006) 10. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Rajagopal (n 19). 
48
 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2004) 196–8. 
49
 Ibid, 223–44.  
50
 Ibid, 207–11. See also Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth, 
and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 95–171. 
51
 Anderson and Grusky (n 17) 18; Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power 
(Simon and Schuster, 2004) 166. 
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resources did not end with the termination of the concession. The environmental disaster in the Lago 
Agrio forced Chevron/Texaco to enter into a remediation agreement with Ecuador. This agreement 
was negotiated and implemented without the active and full participation of the local population. 
Twenty years later, the people who suffered the direct consequences of this disaster are still 
demanding fair reparation.
52
  
 
2. Foreign investor rights, local resources and local consequences 
The IIR is a legal regime that serves to strengthen foreign investor control over local resources, 
particularly key natural resources. Some contributions have underscored the property-focused nature 
of the IIR, when looking at the applicable law in investment arbitration or the types of assets that can 
qualify as an investment.
53
 But the relation between property law and international investment law 
exceeds these questions. The IIR constitutes a set of ground rules for the control of host resources.
54
 
This does not turn this regime into a property or contract system, but foreign investment rules do 
intervene in the domestic legal order, constructing foreign investor rights as a special category of 
entitlements vis-à-vis competing local interests. Investment arbitrators have the task of specifying the 
content of foreign investor rights because—like other property and contractual rights—they are 
incomplete.
55
 And, as they do this, they are also reshaping any competing entitlement since economic 
rights are eminently relational. 
 According to the IIR, the ground rules for the control of host resources operate under a two-
level structure.
56
 The first level is made of the treaties signed by states. These treaties serve the 
function of constitutional property clauses, which in most countries protect property and contractual 
rights.
57
 The second level of this regime is made of the specific entitlements that foreign investors 
acquire when establishing an investment. These can be standardised property rights to land, but most 
modern foreign investments are made up of a complex bundle of negotiated property and contractual 
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rights.
58
 The cases of Aguas del Tunari and Chevron are good examples of this. The foreign investor 
in Aguas del Tunari acquired a concession containing a long list of rights, including an entitlement to 
raise the water tariffs. The foreign investment of Chevron in Ecuador was the outcome of a joint 
venture that gave this investor a certain share of control over the project in Lago Agrio. Later, 
Chevron acquired, through a specific agreement, a privilege to pay compensation for only a very 
small fraction of the resulting environmental damage.    
 What interests me here are the specific rights that foreign investors acquire when establishing a 
project (the second level of the IIR). Foreign investors often do not acquire a standardised bundle of 
rights, but rather negotiate with governments to set the specific scope of control that suits the foreign 
investment.
59
 This has the advantage of facilitating sophisticated business projects that would be 
impossible to organize with traditional property rights. The disadvantage is that the elements that 
characterise standardised property rights are lost in favour of laying down adequate rules for the 
particular economic undertakings.
60
 Consequently, it is difficult for local populations to know in 
advance the scope of control acquired by specific foreign investors. The situation is very different 
from the new neighbour who buys the next house and acquires a predictable bundle of rights. To 
understand the rights assigned to foreign investors, the local population needs to know the details of 
the investment agreement and the standards of the applicable treaty, as well as to understand the 
interpretative techniques that investment arbitrators will likely use to specify the scope of foreign 
investor rights.
61
 The effort needed to understand each new investor’s rights creates an asymmetry of 
information that limits the ability of local populations to realise the implications of any foreign 
investment—in particular, any threat to community values.  
 Consider how this asymmetry manifested in the Aguas del Tunari case. Like Finnegan explains, 
‘[i]n the World Bank’s view, [Cochabamba] was a city that was crying out for water privatisation’.62 
However, the investment project of Aguas del Tunari also implied sudden tariff hikes and a de facto 
limitation on any alternative sources of drinkable water. There is no reason to assume that the local 
population was informed of these new obligations. And this in a context where research began 
questioning the success of water privatisations.
63
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 But there is more at stake here than economic gains (and losses). The private management of a 
public utility—like water and sanitation—operates based on a business rationale. This means that 
values like solidarity and respect for traditional means of obtaining water are overshadowed by 
principles such as efficiency and profitability. Something similar occurs with the production of natural 
resources, which normally have large social implications. The experience of the Lago Agrio shows 
that local lifestyles suffer not only during the period of production but afterwards as well. 
 In short, although the effects of many foreign investment projects are long-lasting, the local 
population may only realise the full extent of these implications when they have already happened. 
The challenge of the IIR, then, is not simply to protect foreign investment. It is to shape an idea of 
foreign investor rights that appeal to the interests and aspirations of foreign investors, host states and 
local populations. The protection of foreign investor rights requires a good justification for any 
negative consequences of foreign investment. 
 
3. Investment tribunals’ interpretation and local aspirations 
The IIR is based on the premise that foreign investors and host states reach an agreement that leads to 
the establishment of a project. This regime aims to protect the micro-rationality of each of these 
agreements.
64
 The obsolescing bargain and the hold-up model —two dominant justifications for the 
IIR—justify investment protection because of the possibility that host states renege on their promises 
after the establishment of the projects.
65
 Reisman puts this clearly when he explains that ‘it is the 
maintenance of the belief in all relevant parties that the legitimate expectations of qualified investors 
based on legal commitments by states are meaningful and will be enforced. No more!’66 The reality is 
more complex, however, because foreign investor rights are relational and are not the product of a 
comprehensive decision on every possible issue. As explained above, foreign investments comprise a 
number of property and contractual rights, both tangible and intangible: ie a collection of relatively 
incomplete entitlements in potential conflict with other rights and values.  
                                                     
64
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But the interpretative technique that investment arbitrators apply to specify foreign investor 
rights is based on the assumption that there is a comprehensive investment decision available 
somewhere. According to the fair and equitable standard, investment arbitrators rely on the doctrine 
of legitimate expectations to look for facts that can serve as bases for foreign investor rights: ie 
evidence of host state representations or promises.
67
 The doctrine of legitimate expectations uses a 
reliance-based reasoning to focus on the dealings that immediately predate the establishment of a 
project. This approach is evidenced by the role that the moment of establishment and the principle of 
good faith play in most investment awards.
68
  
The key of reliance is not the will of the parties and the scope of their commitments, but rather 
the trust of the counterparty on explicit, implicit and tacit representations made on the occasion of the 
decision to invest.
69
 In a promissory estoppel or a contract law scenario, reliance would normally 
work both ways, meaning that not only foreign investors but also host states and local populations 
could benefit from this reasoning. But in the IIR, reliance only favours foreign investors, probably 
because the IIR embodies a substantive rule of law for foreign investors only.
70
 This means that the 
specification of foreign investor rights, ie foreign investor expectations, focuses on the position and 
needs of foreign investors to establish and carry out their investments. Foreign investors require that 
host state representations—even those emerging from the general regulatory framework—have some 
legal value in case the host state or the local population decide to change the law.
71
 
  Reliance fulfils a fundamental role as it serves to impose obligations on host states when no 
contract was signed,
72
 when the government had no intention to bind itself,
73
 or when the bargain does 
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not comply with the legal requirements for its validity, ie ultra vires acts.
74
 An agreement over an 
investment project, for instance, may require more than signing a contract; it may include a review of 
the agreement, the issuance of permits or licences, or the resolution of legal challenges against the 
decision.
75
 But foreign investors cannot be left to depend upon subtleties and niceties of host states 
and local populations.
76
 Following this rationale, many investment tribunals have found that foreign 
investors may acquire entitlements notwithstanding the rest of the administrative or judicial 
procedure.
77
 Host state representations or promises can be enough; they need to be somewhat specific 
but not necessarily explicit.
78
  
This approach to reliance is justified by the need to promote economic development. Some 
investment arbitrators argue that it would be unfair not to protect foreign investor expectations. But, 
ultimately, the main argument is that the disappointment of foreign investor expectations would lead 
to mistrust between foreign investors and host states, reducing foreign investment flows. Promoting 
calculability, in this way, is necessary to encourage economic development.  
This calculability, however, comes with a cost. While specifying foreign investor entitlements 
through the legitimate expectations doctrine, tribunals overlook the rights and aspirations of local 
populations: where does the trust of local communities in their public institutions enter into the 
equation? How does the international community expect local populations to participate in the 
negotiation process and oppose the formation of foreign investor legitimate expectations if these 
expectations can emerge from state representations alone? In the case of Aguas del Tunari, for 
instance, the local population was following the privatisation process very closely, demanding more 
information. Not only was this information never provided, but the water concession was finally 
granted through direct and opaque negotiations.
79
 It is arguable that the social chaos that followed in 
Cochabamba could have been prevented if the creation of foreign investor rights had been done 
according to democratic principles.  
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Something similar happened in the case of Chevron. The negotiations between the government 
of Ecuador and the foreign investor had large environmental implications for the local population. The 
government of Ecuador consented to and approved the inadequate remediation program carried out by 
Chevron without seriously considering the views of the local population.
80
 However, this is not a 
problem for the investment tribunal. The arbitrators decided that Ecuador’s consent is valid and 
encompasses the community interests protected by the constitution. They found that the only rights 
that escape the agreement are private individual rights.
81
    
What is important here is that these two cases are not rare exceptions to the rule in foreign 
investment relations. A look at these relations confirms that multinational corporations and host states 
often gather in places with no cameras or participation of the population. While demonstrations 
appear on TV, foreign investors and host states may be negotiating in the shadows, and sometimes the 
contents of the dealings remain confidential.
82
 The recent fracking agreement between the government 
of Argentina and Chevron, for instance, has not been made public despite public pressure.
83
 Local 
populations thus have severe limitations on how they can learn about the consequences of foreign 
investment decisions. This information imbalance, moreover, may not be just a coincidence, because 
some multinational corporations rely on these dynamics to deal with public outcry. For them, the key 
is detecting controversial issues as quickly as possible ‘to prevent further escalation of the public 
discussion’.84  
International investment law has facilitated these dynamics since the late 1960s and 1970s. As 
suggested above, the role of public international law in the protection of foreign investors depends 
largely on the views of sovereignty. The decolonisation movement saw sovereignty as a means for the 
higher goal of self-determination. Sovereignty was meant to establish community values in territories 
that suffered long periods of foreign control. As Sornarajah explains, however, this notion of 
sovereignty was put into crisis by international investment law in the late 1960s and 1970s. Many 
arbitration tribunals found that, according to public international law, foreign investment contracts can 
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be internationalised.
85
 The internationalisation of these contracts together with a strict interpretation of 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda meant that much of the long struggle for sovereignty could be 
lost with the stroke of a pen.
86
  
 Twenty years later, the IIR and investment arbitration have not fixed this problem; rather, they 
have made it more acute. This regime promotes the doctrine of legitimate expectations, which hinders 
the right to participate in fundamental decisions for many populations around the world. Meanwhile, 
the rights foreign investors acquire can deprive people of other human rights, such as the right to 
water in Cochabamba or the right to a clean environment in Lago Agrio. As a result, it is likely that 
people will challenge these foreign investments in demonstrations and public acts. They did in 
Cochabamba, asking the government to take measures for the protection of the community. After the 
establishment of the foreign investment, however, it is often too late to act because foreign investor 
expectations may already be established and may require protection. At this point, foreign investors 
have two strategies to prevent host states from interfering with their investment.   
First, they can threaten host states with an investment arbitration. This threat alone can be quite 
a powerful tool given the potential costs for host states in terms of reputation, the public financial 
burden of an investment arbitration and the leverage that the threat of a dispute may give to any local 
actor who shares similar interests with the foreign investor. For instance, there is evidence that Philip 
Morris’s lobbying and the threat of arbitration had a chilling effect on the governments of Canada and 
the United Kingdom,
87
 and that some countries have an explicit strategy to reach agreements to avoid 
arbitrations.
88
 Second, as a last resort, foreign investors can file a request for arbitration and pursue 
the case before an investment tribunal. This is less a problem for foreign investors because they can 
place the financial burden of an arbitration on third-party funders.
89
  
In case the host state insists on taking the controversial measure, an investment tribunal may be 
inclined to find that such a government needs to compensate the foreign investor. Acting because of a 
social protest, like the one in Cochabamba, is likely to be interpreted as an arbitrary measure—based 
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on the reasoning that governments should act for regulatory and not political reasons.
90
 But this legal 
position, one could argue, should only be valid after analysing the legitimacy of the foreign 
investment decision. This analysis is important because the actors who do not participate in the 
decisions are those who later may become most vulnerable. And a look at foreign investment relations 
shows that these are not foreign investors. Those who are vulnerable are the local populations of 
places like Cochabamba or Lago Agrio who have no voice in foreign investment decisions.  
This vulnerability, in addition, becomes systemic in a world where states compete for foreign 
investment, and while doing so, make representations and promises to attract foreign investors. This 
may or may not be enough to create legitimate expectations, but are host states and local populations 
in a position to risk the environment or community values before an international investment tribunal?  
 
4. Dealing with multiple expectations: can participation mechanisms help? 
Recognizing the importance of local participation for the creation of foreign investor rights would not 
imply the existence of substantive expectations of host states or local populations. This view is not 
about a right of the local population to, for instance, a clean environment. The argument is rather that 
the use of local resources is fundamental to people’s lives, and therefore local populations should 
have the means to participate in any meaningful decision about these resources. Their needs have to 
play an essential role in foreign investment decisions. Particularly, they should not be ignored or 
overlooked by a legal reasoning that focuses on the position and reliance of foreign investors only. 
Investment decisions are more than business calculations; they are value choices, such as whether or 
not, and how, to produce oil.
91
 It would therefore be unfair and inequitable to make these decisions 
behind the backs of local populations. 
But this happens quite often, unfortunately, and the IIR contributes to this unfair result by 
recognizing and protecting substantive foreign investor expectations. Property is plural and 
incorporates many values, which local laws and judges may articulate in different ways. But a look at 
the IIR shows that this regime has little respect for the constellation of community values.
92
 The 
problem is not that foreign investors acquire entitlements (eg to produce oil). The issue is that the IIR 
and investment arbitrators intervene in foreign investment relations by embedding wealth 
maximisation as the main purpose for foreign investor rights. Accordingly, investment arbitrators 
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promote strong foreign investor rights by focusing on substantive—as opposed to procedural—
expectations.
93
 So it is no longer foreign investors who need to adapt to the locality, but the local 
population that must adapt to the rationality imposed by the foreign investment decision, whether it is 
the rationality of private water supply or of oil drilling and lifting.  
A common argument against the criticism I am making here is that the problem, in fact, lies in 
domestic institutions and governments. The lack of people’s participation in Cochabamba or Lago 
Agrio would be the exclusive result, in this argument, of the deficient institutions in Bolivia and 
Ecuador. It is indisputable that the institutions in Ecuador and Bolivia can be improved, as can the 
institutions in Global North countries. But this does not invalidate the claim that the IIR contributes to 
weakening democracy around the world.
94
 It has been argued that the IIR deals with the lack of good 
institutions in host countries;
95
 however, this claim seems to be limited to the respect of foreign 
investor property and contract rights. Precisely because property is relational, the excessive respect of 
some rights may come at the detriment of others.  
This scenario has produced different reactions at the local and international level. Many 
governments remain unmoved by the risks that foreign investor rights, as specified by investment 
arbitrators, pose for local populations. Rather, they ensure that the requirements to create foreign 
investor rights remain low, when they are not simply repealing them. An initiative in Egypt, for 
instance, limits judicial challenges of foreign investment decisions to minimise state liability and 
favour foreign investor calculability.
96
 A number of foreign investment decisions were judicially 
challenged in Egypt, bringing about uncertainty for foreign investors. The solution was to limit the 
ability of the local population to participate by challenging foreign investment decisions. Part of the 
media sees this as a salutary move because it would limit state international liability. These 
commentators, again, overlook democratic principles and human rights.
97
 They are not worried that 
foreign investors can gain control of key resources through simple administrative channels, despite 
this being a fundamental decision for the population. 
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In Latin America, on the contrary, some countries have reacted by implementing constitutional 
requirements to consult indigenous groups before the establishment of a foreign investment in their 
land.
98
 In general, however, the implementation of this right of prior consultation still faces several 
challenges. The main one is that the process of prior consultation often depends on host states and, 
paradoxically, on foreign investors.
99
 This is a major problem because host states often need to attract 
foreign investment to promote growth and increase revenues, while foreign investors are interested in 
profit opportunities and not in local aspirations. In the case of Ecuador, for instance, the right of prior 
consultation is established in the constitution, but the evidence shows that it has not been adequately 
applied in practice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has condemned Ecuador for the 
violation of the right of prior consultation in the Sarayaku case.
100
 
At the international level, there are also important developments related to indigenous land 
rights and prior consultation. International treaties are increasingly demanding that states obtain the 
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) before they transfer any right over indigenous land to private 
parties, including foreign investors.
101
 When analysing the difficulties in implementing FPIC, the 
literature highlights two elements. First, states often promote the use of indigenous land for economic 
activities like mining and agribusiness.
102
 Second, there are difficulties implementing FPIC because of 
the different normative contexts. Normally, indigenous groups have a communal understanding of 
property that clashes with private property. This makes it difficult to determine when there is consent; 
among other issues, it raises the question of whether or not the people have full knowledge and 
appreciation of the situation. Some authors, for this reason, suggest that it is necessary to involve 
anthropologists in the FPIC process.
103
         
As the literature on FPIC suggests, international law and institutions can promote broader local 
participation in foreign investment decisions. International law could serve to protect the voice of 
local populations when states are focused on attracting foreign investment. For instance, the 
implementation of prior consultation may be a good tool for any foreign investment with a large 
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social impact, and not only for projects related to indigenous land rights.
104
 These consultations could 
lead to conservation contracts.
105
 Medium and small projects, on the other hand, may require 
considering simpler mechanisms.  
But establishing an international regime capable to give local populations a meaningful role in 
foreign investment governance —ie a regime beyond investment protection and arbitration— would 
demand a large institutional reform. In the meantime, investment tribunals have the possibility to 
shape the applicable rules to foreign investment relations. As an arbitrator stated in a dissenting 
opinion, nowhere in investment treaties are tribunals required to apply the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations.
106
 The one-sided application of the reliance reasoning is a way to intervene in foreign 
investment relations in favour of foreign investors. This means that arbitrators could also intervene in 
favour of local populations by implementing stricter rules for the creation of foreign investor rights. 
 
Conclusions 
Supporters argue that the IIR is justified because foreign investors do not vote or participate in 
domestic political decisions. Corporations the size of Bechtel or Chevron, however, never invest 
without discussing directly with host governments the conditions of their projects and the contents of 
their rights. In these discussions, the actors who rarely participate are local populations. 
Against this background, the IIR strengthens the bargaining positions of foreign investors and 
their resulting rights as a means to facilitate wealth maximisation through foreign investment. This 
regime intervenes in foreign investment relations by interpreting the results of investment decisions, 
ie the scope of foreign investor rights. This article has focused on how investment tribunals privilege 
the trust and calculability of foreign investors over the participation of local actors directly affected by 
foreign investment decisions. Arbitrators rely on a reliance-based reasoning to specify foreign 
investor expectations based on explicit or implicit host state representations—including ultra vires 
acts. The core of this reasoning is not state intention but foreign investor expectations. At no time 
have arbitrators apparently noticed that this interpretative technique disregards not only the intentions 
of host governments, but also the possibility of local participation in these fundamental decisions. 
As a result, many people around the world have little or no say in foreign investment decisions 
with respect to key local resources. These decisions can affect not only domestic private rights but 
also community values. Here is where some proposals to fix the IIR fail to grasp the complexity of the 
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problem. From a holistic perspective, the IIR emerges as a site of social struggle that exceeds foreign 
investor rights and the host state’s regulatory authority. Choices about the allocation and use of 
resources imply value decisions and these decisions can jeopardise local populations. 
In this light, this article concludes with an appeal to think differently about foreign investment 
governance, both at the institutional and legal levels. Arguably, there is a need for an international 
regime to govern foreign investment, but this regime should go beyond investment protection and 
arbitration. There is, in this respect, increasing consensus that people should engage with the IIR.
107
 
Prior consultation and FPIC could arguably be expanded to every foreign investment with a large 
social impact. These mechanisms, however, may be inadequate in the case of medium and small 
projects. Investment tribunals can also contribute to this transformation by reconsidering the use of 
doctrines such as legitimate expectations and by starting to view foreign investor rights through the 
principles of equality and participation. 
Enabling local participation in foreign investment decisions, however, should not be seen as a 
panacea for the protection of the plurality of community values. Democratic mechanisms are not 
necessarily a means to plurality.
108
 Participation may help to protect community values around the 
world, but we should not expect that participation would solve all the problems. It is likely that many 
populations will say yes to foreign investments that could prove devastating for their rights and 
community values because of the need for jobs and economic growth. For this reason, it is necessary 
to think through how foreign investors could adapt more to local populations. The interaction and 
balance of different values in property remain fundamental challenges of our social organization, 
particularly, in times where economic growth continues to be the main preoccupation of most private 
and public actors.   
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